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Two years after the defendant had bccn convicted of rape, lie utilized
the Illinois Post Conviction -learing Act to claim that the jurors had been
biased to his detriment as a result of their having read grossly prejudicial
newspaper accounts' during his trial. On appeal by the state, after the
post conviction hearing resulted in a new trial, the court held, that the
rights of thc defendant were inproperly abridged. People v. Hryciuk, 5 111.
2d 176, 125 N.E.2d 61 (1955).
The general rule, long established and closely followed, is that the
power to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury is resorted to in oiily
the most radical of cases. 2  However, great latitude is exercised by some
courts,3 while other courts are extremely conservative in their use of
judicial discretion. 4  When newspapers preoccupy themselves with a trial,
but no manifestation of prejudice is noted in a juror, the withdrawal of
the juror lies within the province of judicial discretion.,
It is not enough that newspaper accounts be read by the members
of the panel singly or collectively; their impact upon the panel must be
of an inordinately damaging nature.7  If impressions are derived from
cxtra-courtroom sources, the court can accept without question the absence
of prejudice from a juror if they fail within the category of "light im-
pressions." However, "strong impressions," (which block objectivity) do
constitute objection sufficient to support withdrawal.8
Judicial discretion is open to criticism only when grossly abused.
Thus the trial court may refuse to declare a mistrial and the appellate
court subsequently decline to reverse the decision since the abberration
1. As the court stated in the instant case, "Two of the Chicago daily newspapers
published articles about the trial . . . headlined in heavy print, one reading, 'State
Will Ask Chair for Young Slaying Suspect,' and the other, 'Slaying Confession Read
in Trial."
The court further stated, "On the evening before they were to render verdict
[lurors] . . . read in newspapers that defendant had confessed to two murders,
had boasted of attacking more than 50 women, and was described by the police as a
'vicious degenerate' . . ." People v. iryciuk, 5 1. 2d 176, 180, 181, 125 N.E. 2d 61,
62 (1955).
2. Rosenhlum v. State, 55 Su.2d 119 (Fla. 1951); State ex rel Alcala v. Grayson,
156 Fla. 435, 23 So.2d 484 (1945); Jeffcoat v. State, 103 Fla. 466, 138 So. 385
(1931); People v. Murawski, 349 II1. 236, 68 N.E.2d 273 (1946); People v. Mannion,
89 Ill 478, 59 N.E.2d 810 (1945); People v. Harrison, 384 I11. 201, 51 N.E.2d
172 (1943); People v. Mangano, 354 Ill. 329, 188 N.E. 475 (1933); People v.
Herbert, 340 Ill. 320, 172 N.E. 740 (1930); Collins v. Dunbar, 131 Me. 337. 162
Atl. 897 (1932); Shafer v. Kansas City Ry., 201 SAV. 611 (Mo. App., 1918); contra:
ihImter v. Wade, 169 F.2d 973 (1948).
3. Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392 (1939).
4. Griffin v. United States, 295 Fed. 437 (3d Cir. 1924); People v. Murawski.
349 Ill. 236, 68 N.E.2d 273 (1946); Coughlin v. People, 144 Ill. 140, 33N.E. 1 (1893).
5. Commonwealth v. Schultz, 170 Pa. Super. 504, 87 A.2d 69 (1952).
6. Willis v. State, 128 Tex. Cr. 504, 81 S.V.2d 693 (1935).
7. 'Wilson v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 295 Pa. 168, 145 Atl. 81 (1929).
N. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49, No. 14,169 2g (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
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may not have amounted to gross abuse." The gross abuse of discretion
must be of substantial prejudice to the defendant.' The bench, generally
is permitted to exercise great latitude in its judicial discretion, since even
when jurors acknowledge perusal of newspapers containing damaging
accounts, it may satisfy itself that there was "little remembered" by the
juror, and refuse the motion to dismiss." An antiethical attitude is
apparent when another court withdraws a juror if the defense can meet
the burden of proof as to the periodical's having been read.' " Tie defense
must advance the irregularity and move for a mistrial; the court cannot
do so of its own motion.' 3 Where the court is convinced of the soundness
of the defense's objection and is willing to remove the juror, if the defense
withdraws its objection upon the juror's protestations of freedom from
bias, there can be no appeal upon the grounds of prejudice concerning
that juror.'4
In the instant case, the trial court committed an obvious abuse of
its judicial discretion in refusing withdrawal of jurors exposed to inflam.
matory newspaper accounts. The appellate court rectified the injustice by
considering the opinions derived from the accounts as being of a definitely
prejudicial nature and obstructing the resolution of the evidence as pre-
sented at trial, and ordered a new trial.
It appears that the appellate court was correct in holding that the
defendant's rights were infringed upon.
The majority view draws a distinction between opinion of the juror
and his prejudice or bias. 15  This is semantic jousting, or as stated in
Smith v. Eames:"6
* .. The human mind is so constituted that it is almost impossible,
on hearing a report freely circulated ...to prevent it from coming
to some conclusion on the subject; and this will always be the
case while the mind continues susceptible to the impressions ...
Opinion, however, whether it is deep or superficial, must be over-
come by a preponderance of evidence to the contrary. It is clear that
this is an unjust position in which to place a litigant, especially in the
light of our constitutional guaranty of an impartial jury. Subscription to
any opinion, which is capabie of expression, or admission of having read
grossly prejudicial material must constitute disqualification of a juror if
the substantive right to a fair trial is to be preserved.
HAROLD P. BARBIs
9. Commonwealth v. Donaducy, 167 Pa. Super. 611.
10. Green v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 826, 4 S.W.2d 1109 (1927); Common-
wealth v. Schumann, 162 Pa. Super. 330, 57 A.2d 425 (1948).
11. United States v. Wolf, 102 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
12. United States v. Katz. 78 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
13. Commonwealth v. Mehlman, 163 Pa, Super. 534, 63 A.2d 400 (1949).
14. Marin v. United States, 167 Fed. 951 (3d Cir. 1909).
15. Olive v. State, 34 Fla. 203, 15 So. 925 (1894).
16. 3 Scam. 76, 78 (1841).
